Introduction
Non-state providers 1 play an important role in the delivery of health services in Indonesia.
First, like in many low and middle-income countries the private sector is often the preferred choice of provider -even among the poor -because of perceived higher quality and availability of medicines. Nearly two-thirds of outpatient utilization and two-fifths of inpatient utilization of health care services takes place in the private sector in Indonesia. As a result, there is growing interest in leveraging the potential of the private sector.
Second, civil society organizations (CSOs) -including non-governmental organizations and non-profit organizations -are an integral part of Indonesia's national response to the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV}, tuberculosis (TB), and malaria.
However, a significant portion of health programs implemented by CSOs are reliant on resources provided by development partners.
1 Non-state providers are non-government service providers which may include private sector.
Indonesia is losing access to donor aid threatening the financial and programmatic sustainability of traditionally donor-funded programs. While the country remains eligible at least until 2022 to access support from the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB , Malaria (GF ATM) -Indonesia's most significant donor in the health sector -there is a strong push to use domestic resources from the government. Average annual disbursements from official development aid over the period 2010-2015 for ATM programs amounted to just US$98.2 million (compared to the $180 million spent by the Ministry of Health (MOH) on Disease Control or the $3.2 billion spent on health overall over the same period) predominantly from the GF, Australia, and the US (OECD, 2017) (Table 1) . Though external financing represents a small share of overall health spending, it accounts for a significant share (40-50%) of resources for HIV, TB, and malaria -meaning that there will likely be significant gaps in service delivery if activities supported by donors are not picked up by the government (Magnani, et al., 2018) . 
Main donors
Predominantly GF, US Predominantly GF, Australia, US Predominantly GF While the types of activities traditionally funded by donors can be delivered by either the public or private sector, the nature of these services mean that they are generally under-provided by the private sector. In Indonesia, donor resources are primarily used for the del ivery of HIV services to key affected populations (particularly harm reduction programs, sensitization and educational campaigns), TB services through community outreach, and the d istribution of bed nets in high prevalence malaria areas. While in principle such activities fall under the mandate of puskesmas -the entry into the public health system -few carry out such work either for lack of funding, human resources, or stigma and discrimination . At the same time, these types of services are labor-intensive and have low-profit margins making them less attractive to the private sector. Interventions to treat communicable diseases are also generally considered merit goods as they have positive externalities that extend beyond the select group who can afford to pay for them (i .e. the likelihood of further transmission diminishes in the population as a whole if those affected are treated). As a result, these services end up being funded by donors and implemented by CSOs (ibid).
The main objective of this policy note is to better understand the key challenges to engaging with CSOs. As external sources phase out, more sustainable domestic mechanisms will be needed. (Agustina, 2018) . While this mechanism offers an opportunity for CSOs to engage in the budget and planning process, rules for representation differ from one region to another with some being more inclusive than others 5 • In addition, not all proposals agreed in lower level Musrenbangs receive final budget approval with the level of transparency varying across regions. Overall, the process from budget drafting to project implementation can take up to two years. 
Mechanisms for channeling public funds to CSOs
There are two major mechanisms available within the State budget (APBN) to channel public funds directly to CSOs and other entities.
The first channel is through the procurement mechanism (belanja pengadaan barang dan jasa), which can further be divided into procurement using:
• a competitive bidding process for products and services the government needs that are widely available in the market (i.e. CSOs act as vendors/contractors via a tender mechanism), or
• the self-management or swakelola process for goods and services the government needs but which cannot be provided by the private sector'. The swake/o/a mechanism empowers the government institution responsible for the budget by giving them more flexibility in implementing government programs. In swake/o/a projects, the government budget holder may design and plan activities, but execution can be done by its own employees, employees from other government offices and communities or CSOs. When CSOs are engaged, they will act as implementing partners via direct appointment or contest if more than one CSO is eligible. 6 Other than unavailability in the private sector, Swakelola regulation, i.e. LKPP regulation no 8/2018, also listed the following as other reasons for its use: optimizing & improving in-house capacity, encouraging public participation, improving effectivity and efficiency, procurement of classified materials/services.
The second channel is via the grant mechanism which can also be divided into programmatic central (bantuan pemerintah) and regional government or regional social assistance/emergency response grants (hibah pemerintah daerah and bansos pemda). Grants are allocated by direct appointment based on the technical implementation guidelines decided by the budget holder. Grants are allocated directly usually because there is no vendor in the commercial market and beneficiaries for National Programs or and Regional Development Plans are already identified.
The main differences between the above-mentioned fund channeling mechanisms lie in the degree of flexibility assigned to CSOs in use of resources, eligibility criteria for receiving public funds, and accountability mechanisms. As seen in Table 2 , the National Public Procurement Agency (Lembaga Kebijakan Pengadaan Barang Jasa Pemerintah/ LKPP), the Ministry of Finance (MOF), or the Ministry of Home Affairs (MOHA) all act as a regulatory agency depending on the mechanism being pursued.
As a result, each mechanism has different eligibility criteria to receive public funds, flexibility on allowable expenditures, and requirements for reporting . For example, programmatic grants may be more flexible than procurement methods as they allow recipients to organize resources across expenditure categories (e.g. salaries and wages, goods, non-operational expenses, etc.) as they best see fit to deliver on program objectives; they may also allow funding for multi-year planning and activities such as infrastructure development or capacity building investments that may take several years to achieve. However, the variability in eligibility and accountability requirements is greater as each ministry can define its own specifications. Program performance is also delegated to CSOs rather than the Ministries. Therefore, the potential for weaker accountability is also higher ( Figure 2 ). ii) evidence of paid up capital, the amount of which is at least IDR 50 million for small enterprise, 500 million for medium enterprise and 1 0 billion for big enterprise and iii) Single Business Identification number (Nomor lnduk Berusaha) obtained from ass.go.id which further require business licenses, investment plan, labour plan, and taxation/excise facility plan. CSOs themselves, being a foundation or association, cannot directly obtain enterprise status, but they may have direct association or shares in a subsidiary who has enterprise status. Very few CSOs have the capacity and resources to have an enterprise who can compete in competitive bidding mechanism. 9 This requirement is limiting for CSOs as they do not typically conduct audits. However, they may still be able to access the swake/o/a mechanism if they partner with bigger or more established CSOs. In addition to mechanisms that directly channel public funds to CSOs, indirect funding through partnerships is also possible. The government may choose to channel funds to CSOs through a partnership platform which pools funds from different contributors and take on the responsibility for accountability arrangements when CSOs don't fully meet certain standards 10 • Another reason for using the partnership mechanism is to leverage or increase public sector resources with other sources of funding. As depicted in Figure 3 , funds from state budget will always be recorded in the statebudget document (or DIPA) and follow state treasury processes (on budget, on treasury). On the other hand, funds from donor can be channeled to implementers (including CSOs) via three routes: i) similar to how state budget is being channeled (on budget, on treasury); ii) on budget but not recorded and paid using state treasury processes (on budget, off treasury); iii) or directly to implementers without integration to either the state budget or treasury processes (off budget, off treasury). Most donor resources flow either on-budget, off-treasury as in the case of the Global Fund or completely off-budget as in the case of USAID and DFAT. collected, is carried out by multiple entities at the national and subnational level with no one responsible for overall coordination. Similarly, CSOs lack access to information on opportunities to work with selected subnational governments as there is no call for proposals initiated by the budget holder. In cases where multiple CSOs are working on the same issues, weak coordination often makes it harder for them to access funding and scale their impact.
Type of Mechanism

Limited capacity
On the one hand, not all government agencies (in particular subnational regions) have the capacity to contract and manage engagement with CSOs as many do not have an established mechanism to review, assess, and synergize different CSO's proposals. Also, CSOs often do not provide sufficient documentation of proposed activities and resource requirements for national and subnational governments to be able to allocate budget. On the other hand, CSOs have limited resources and capacity to fully engage in the Government's lengthy planning cycle. And despite the relatively straightforward process for registering as a CSO and obtaining legal entity status, most CSOs fail to meet the additional requirements needed to access public funds such as providing tax identification numbers and tax and financial reports. Important accountability elements such as reporting, monitoring and evaluation are also not always properly managed .
Incomplete trust
Despite widespread agreement on the importance of CSOs in service delivery, government institutions are reluctant to channel public resources to CSOs as they are seen as risky and administratively cumbersome to deal with. Government's familiarity with CSOs are also mainly through donor-CSO engagement where donor priorities often end up driving the type of activity rather than national or Government priorities 11 • However, this tendency to adopt donor priorities might also reflect capacity constraints (on both the Government and CSO side) in terms of identifying local needs and designing a targeted and complementary response. From the CSO perspective, lack of transparency in planning and budgeting processes serves as a disincentive to actively engage in a lengthy and burdensome musrenbang process.
In contrast, the main donor in the health sector -the Global Fund -offers a more structured process to support and engage with civil society. Table 3 compares the GF versus the Government fund channeling mechanism to CSOs. Compared with the Government mechanism, the GF planning process is much shorter, the project cycle longer, and coordination and support greater. This makes the process less burdensome and offers greater flexibility for multi-year projects. It also provides a platform and resources to review the technical soundness of proposals and identify necessary capacity building activities in areas that implementers might be lacking in (e.g . financial management, procurement, and monitoring and evaluation). However, it focuses mainly on HIV, TB, and malaria rather than the service delivery needs of the broader health sector. Still, a similar or complementary arrangement may be needed to help facilitate public sector engagement with CSOs. Australia provides another example on how it deals with CSO (Box 1).
Box 1: CSO Regulatory Environment in Australia
Australia established the Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits Commission (ACNC) as the national regulator of charities. The ACNC's has two main objectives: 1) to support charities with information, advice, and guidance, and 2) to maintain and disseminate information about the not-for-profit sector through a free searchable database of charities.
While registration is not mandatory, only registered charities can apply for the various tax concessions and benefits offered by the government. For example, incentives that allow donors to claim gifts and donations to charity as tax deductions are only available to registered charities. The public may raise concern about a charity to the ACNC as it has the power to: i) give warnings, ii) provide direction, iii) enforce corrective actions, and iv) revoke registration status. Beyond requirements from the ACNC, public agencies who are working with charities and not-for-profits commonly require mandatory cost-sharing from charities' own funds in the amount of 20% of the total project value.
The ACNC registers organisations as charities and works with the tax office as well other public agencies who regulate the services provided by charities. Its 'Charity Passport' initiative allows different government agencies to remotely access information such as responsible persons, beneficiaries, size, financial reports, governing rules and operating locations. The Charity Passport initiative is part of the ACNC's drive to reduce red tape by using the report once, use often paradigm .
Source: www.acnc.gov.au 
Key messages
This policy note describes the main mechanisms and challenges to engaging with CSOs in Indonesia and proposes areas for future engagement. While APBN-to-CSO fund channeling mechanisms do exist, they are not well known or used by budget holders. In reality, the most feasible mechanisms for CSOs to engage with are the programmatic grants. CSOs will not likely be able to compete with the private sector under the competitive bidding mechanism; they are also unlikely to be able to fulfill the 3-year audit requirement under the swakelola mechanism . There are also significant reservations among implementing units to use the new swakelola mechanism as it places the burden on developing guidelines for bidding and selection of CSOs on them 12 . While CSOs could partner with a more established entity that has a history and culture of financial audits, this would require them to be able to first identify and coordinate with suitable partners; this is not a given .
To facilitate engagement between the GOI and non-state providers an enabling environment is needed . This should include i) addressing information gaps between Government budget holders and CSOs on all available opportunities; ii) strengthening current budget and planning processes including capacity building support to funders and recipients to prepare, submit, review and assess proposals;
and iii) improving transparency and accountability for health sector performance. The strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats to CSO engagement that have been identified in this report are summarized in Annex 3 for easy reference. 
Addressing information gaps
Strengthening budget and planning processes
• At the Central level, as part of the MOH's implementation guidelines, direction should be given to CSOs to develop proposals in a standardized format so that government budget holders can assess the technical and financial quality of proposals in a more comparable way. It would also help create greater transparency around the requirements, timeline, and selection criteria especially in regions with a less inclusive musrenbang process.
• At the national level, the Ministry of Budget and Planning has already launched an internet-mediated platform for musrenbangs which has been taken up by some sub-national governments. This could be expanded to enable a centralized platform where budget holders can list their call for proposals to facilitate CSOs' access to potential opportunities.
• Capacity also needs to be developed for government budget holders to identify, appraise, and evaluate whether engagement with non-state providers provides added value compared to existing public sector options and/or the private sector.
This may require tailoring the GOl's existing public-private-partnership framework to the health sector and exposing Bappenas and the MOF to a broader menu of PPP options (e.g. service delivery, hospital infrastructure, facility management, transport and distribution of medicines). This may also require coordination with BP JS-K who contract with both public and private sector providers to deliver services (see related policy note on private sector).
Improving transparency and accountability
• All of the recommendations above would help improve the transparency and accountability of government budget holders and CSOs alike.
participating units, as well as with Bappenas -the coordinator for transition of externally-funded health programs. At the same time, spending units' main concern had been the absence of a formal mention of collaboration with CSOs (as recently formalized under the newly revised regulation on public procurement) in the MoH's planning guidelines.
Annex 1 -Laws and Regulations
Related to Civil Societies in
Indonesia Topics
Definition of CSO
Types of Procurement mechanism
Mechanism 1: Fund channeling using competitive bidding for commercial entities.
Legislation
Article 1, Government Regulation in lieu of Law (Perpu) no 2/2017 " ... organization established and constructed voluntarily by communities based on similarities in aspiration, motivation, needs, interests, activities and objectives to participate in development to achieve the goals laid out by Republic of Indonesia as a country, based on principles in Pancasila and the 1945 constitution" . 
Sub-national grants can be given to central government, other sub national government, state enterprise, CSOs with legal status. Ministry of Home Affairs regulation no 14/2016 Article 1.8 stated that whoever the beneficiary will be, the decision to give grants to beneficiary should be formalized in a decree of Head of Sub-national Government. • Although LKPP has given more freedom to budget holders to design their own procurement mechanism, without the explicit sign-off from government auditors and law enforcement authorities budget holders will be unwilling to develop their own contest mechanisms to select CSOs
• Government audit office(s) and law enforcement authorities are not yet involved in the discussion and may raise objections • Socialization and capacity building in a decentralized context will require significant government investment given the variety in decision making processes and differences in capacity
